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The Political Economy of Economic Empowerment: Bringing Politics and 
Society Back In 
Ali Cheema  
 
Summary  
Economic empowerment programmes designed to mitigate inequalities are increasingly 
becoming an important part of the portfolio for governments in low-income countries (LICs). 
These programmes give primacy to interventions in the ‘economic sphere’. Their underlying 
theory of change not only expects a positive impact on economic empowerment, it also 
expects positive ‘spillovers’ that will change the norms, behaviours, roles and bargaining 
power that underpin social and political empowerment. This paper reviews the empirical 
evidence and finds that more often than not these interventions do not strengthen economic 
empowerment. It also finds that very few programmes create the hypothesised ‘spillovers’ in 
the social and political spheres. The paper shows that programme outcomes and scale-up 
are sensitive to the social and political context, in particular the distribution of power and 
resources among gainers and losers. An important message from this paper is that a robust 
theory of change must be informed by empirical research that enables us to see how the 
context, in particular the distribution of power, is shaped. It also reviews the literature on 
political collective action and institutions to identify political economy mechanisms that are 
argued either to catalyse or to inhibit the creation, sustainability and survival of effective 
economic empowerment programmes in LICs and fragile and conflict-affected settings 
(FCAS). 
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1 Introduction  
Economically empowering citizens remains an important global challenge. Economic 
empowerment can be defined as expanding the capabilities and agency of women and men 
to make decisions and influence outcomes regarding opportunities for decent livelihoods and 
equality in access to and control over productive assets, market opportunities and public 
services (Duflo 2012; OECD 2012; Kabeer 2012; VeneKlasen and Miller 2002; Ibrahim and 
Alkire 2007). The challenge is not only in expanding individual capabilities and agency, but it 
is also in strengthening collective agency.1 There is considerable evidence that ‘persistent 
inequalities’ in access to, and control over, assets, market opportunities and power exist. The 
literature shows that these inequalities are related to attributes – gender, race, place of 
residence, ethnicity, family of origin, class – that are structural and not derived through 
choice (World Bank 2006; Banerjee et al. 2006; Bowles et al. 2006; Duflo 2012; Black and 
Devereux 2011; Clark 2014; Chetty et al. 2014; Corak 2013). The evidence shows that 
persistent inequalities are a significant cause of economic disempowerment.  
 
As a result, economic empowerment programmes designed to mitigate inequalities are 
increasingly becoming an important part of the portfolio of governments in low-income 
countries (LICs). The programmes aim to achieve a variety of goals and outcomes related to 
economic empowerment. These include increasing voice, capabilities, access to and control 
over critical assets and livelihood opportunities, and access to markets and public services 
for disempowered citizens (OECD 2012; Kabeer 2012; Narayan 2002; IDRC 2013). The 
programmes are targeted at the poor, particularly women, and use a mix of instruments 
which can be broadly categorised as ‘market access’ and ‘state redistribution’ interventions, 
to mitigate persistent inequalities. Public action has a central role in these programmes, as 
an underlying assumption is that markets left alone do not work for the poor. What is 
common in these core interventions is that they give primacy to the economic sphere.2  
 
However, these programmes also aim to affect a broader set of indicators related to 
empowerment and collective action in the social and political spheres. The expectation is that 
the economic interventions pursued by the programmes will create ‘spillovers’ through the 
resulting economic empowerment that will change the norms, behaviours, roles and 
bargaining power that underpin empowerment and action within households, markets and 
communities. In addition, it is expected that the resulting economic empowerment will also 
strengthen the ability of the disempowered to undertake collective action that will influence 
community decisions as well as state laws and policies. In short, the expectation of 
programme initiators is that economic interventions will not only strengthen economic 
empowerment, but that they will also unleash dynamics with the potential to strengthen 
empowerment and action in the family, society and the polity. The theoretical underpinnings 
of economic empowerment programmes are further discussed in Section 2. 
 
This paper asks whether empowerment and action of marginalised groups is strengthened 
as a result of external interventions that lie primarily in the economic sphere. Section 3 
addresses this question through an analysis of the evidence. The main focus in the section is 
on the findings from quantitative research including impact evaluations and other empirical 
research using sophisticated identification techniques. The evidence shows that more often 
than not these interventions do not strengthen economic empowerment. It also shows that 
when they do, their effect is limited to increasing access to and control over the particular 
service or asset that is being offered by the programme. There are very few programmes that 
                                                 
1  The literature recognises the importance of collective action for empowerment as ‘collective power with others’ 
 enables the development of social and political agency that can change norms and institutions that underlie 
 disempowerment (Eyben et al. 2008; Kabeer 2012). 
2  These instruments are sometimes complemented by interventions designed to change behaviour (life skills training, 
 family planning, and day care services), enhance voice and make changes in laws and regulations. 
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create the hypothesised ‘spillovers’ that are expected to positively impact a broader set of 
empowerment and collective action indicators. I also show that even in successful cases, 
there is little evidence that working interventions tend to scale-up. 
 
In examining whether the social and political context matters for programme success and 
why, Section 4 uses evidence of public action for economic empowerment and shows that it 
can result in diametrically opposite outcomes in different contexts. This suggests that context 
does matter. Public action for empowerment unleashes distributive conflicts between the 
gainers (the disempowered) and the losers (the empowered) as it attempts to change the 
distribution of power and resources. This often results in retaliatory actions by the losers that 
can raise the social costs3 of creating, sustaining or scaling-up an intervention. Khan (2009) 
suggests that these costs include the costs of negotiating an intervention and contesting it. 
The literature suggests that social costs are a function of the distribution of political and 
organisational power in society (Khan 2009), which is a function of political and social 
institutions and norms (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008a; Khemani 2016).  
 
Section 4 further argues that the recognition that context matters takes us beyond concerns 
of external validity in programme evaluation (Deaton 2010; Acemoglu 2010). It implies that a 
robust theory of change must incorporate actions and responses in the social and political 
sphere that are a result of the economic intervention. It must model the specific mechanisms 
underlying these actions and responses and assess whether it is more effective to enhance 
economic empowerment through interventions in the economic or in the social and political 
spheres. The robust theory of change must be informed by empirical research that enables 
us to see how the context, in particular the distribution of power, is shaped. Pawson and 
Tilley (1997) argue that outcomes of interventions are generated by a combination of 
mechanisms and context (Deaton 2010). This implies that the identification of effective 
interventions cannot proceed without understanding how this combination works in specific 
contexts. In spite of the importance of this combination, very few programmes articulate a 
theory of change that is informed by a rigorous analysis of the political and social context 
(Joshi 2014). And few evaluations rigorously test heterogeneous impacts across different 
contextual factors. 
 
Section 5 of the paper addresses the question of which features of context matter for 
economic empowerment in LICs. The section reviews the literature on political collective 
action and institutions to identify political economy mechanisms that are argued either to 
catalyse or to inhibit the creation, sustainability and survival of effective economic 
empowerment programmes in LIC contexts (Khemani 2016; Acemoglu and Robinson 2008a; 
Khan 2009; Azulai et al. 2014). I focus on the political context as my interest is on the effect 
of economic empowerment interventions that reach a critical scale that enables them to have 
systemic impact. Section 4 shows that successful public action for economic empowerment 
is a function of the ability of disempowered groups to succeed in distributive conflicts with 
empowered groups. Section 5 argues that specific features of political action and institutions 
are important determinants of the outcomes of these distributive conflicts in LICs. It shows 
that these features affect outcomes by impacting accountability, political selection, inclusive 
representation and conflict.  
 
Section 6 draws on the literature to provide implications for economic empowerment 
programmes in fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCAS). Currently, about two billion 
people live in countries that are fragile and conflict-affected and externally funded economic 
empowerment programmes are increasingly concentrated there (Blattman and Ralston 2015; 
World Bank 2015). Section 6 reviews the findings from the nascent literature on economic 
empowerment programmes in FCAS. It argues that while the evidence suggests that 
                                                 
3  This is similar to the notion of transition costs proposed by Khan (2009) and the recognition by Acemoglu and 
 Robinson (2008a) that the relative political power of different groups will determine institutional change. 
 8 
 
contextual factors matter, programme design pays these little heed. Finally, I draw on the 
previous sections to suggest future directions for research on action for empowerment in 
FCAS. I draw on the broader political economy and development literature as there have 
been few rigorous, well-identified evaluations of programmes in FCAS (Blattman and Ralston 
2015). 
 
2  Theoretical underpinnings of economic 
empowerment programmes  
Donor-supported economic empowerment programmes are informed by the recent 
theoretical and empirical literature on persistent inequalities, deprivation and poverty traps 
(Dercon 2003; World Bank 2006; OECD 2012; Banerjee et al. 2006; Kabeer 2012). The 
underlying rationale for programme design comes from the recognition that persistent 
inequalities and poverty traps are pervasive in LICs. It follows that well-designed policies that 
are able to mitigate these challenges have the potential to strengthen economic 
empowerment by improving deprived citizens’ access to and control over critical assets and 
livelihood opportunities and access to markets. It is also hypothesised that well-designed 
policies are likely to have positive spillover effects on a broad range of empowerment 
indicators. A significant expectation is that these policies will improve the productivity and 
earning potential of deprived citizens in addition to their empowerment. That is why many 
economic empowerment interventions are often a part of inclusive growth programmes. 
Finally, there is recognition that markets do not work for the poor on their own and an 
important objective of these programmes is to change this.  
 
Persistent inequality and poverty traps are argued to be a consequence of structural 
inequalities interacting with a range of imperfections in the markets for credit, insurance and 
labour. It is well documented that credit markets are plagued with asymmetric information 
(moral hazard and adverse selection) and enforcement problems. This results in lenders 
making access to finance contingent on securities such as collateral, which 
disproportionately affect the poor. There are a number of models that show how credit 
market imperfections can interact with initial assets inequality to create low productivity and 
poverty traps (Azariadis 1996; Banerjee 2003; Mookherjee and Ray 2003; Eswaran and 
Kotwal 1986; Banerjee and Newman 1993; Ghatak 2014; Kraay and McKenzie 2014). 
Ghatak (2014) shows that initial inequality of assets will result in poverty traps if production or 
savings technologies are subject to non-convexities (due, for example, to weak property 
rights) and imperfect markets.  
 
Ghatak (2014) also shows that poverty traps can result if non-convexities interact with market 
imperfections in other markets, such as human capital and insurance. Human capital market 
imperfections will make it difficult for the asset-poor to acquire skills using the market 
mechanism. The main mechanism for the intergenerational transmission of skills in this 
context will tend to be the family. This can exacerbate human capital inequality if the initial 
distribution of skills is unequal. Dercon (2003) argues that another serious market failure 
impacting the poor disproportionately is the lack of security and insurance in the face of risk. 
Insurance market imperfections are also likely to arise due to asymmetric information and 
enforcement problems. These imperfections are likely to cause considerable problems in 
LICs because of the high incidence of shocks related to natural disasters, conflicts, and 
insecurity, as well as income and health shocks.  
 
Dasgupta and Ray (1986) show that persistent inequalities can also arise due to nutritional 
traps. Their model shows that there is a non-linear relationship between food consumption 
and physical capacity for work. Nutritional traps arise because poor individuals are too 
malnourished to physically be able to do productive work, leading to low earning capacity 
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and low production ability resulting in continued malnutrition. Individuals are thus trapped in a 
low-productivity–malnutrition equilibrium. 
 
The key point highlighted by these models is that the issue is not just inequity. The existence 
of poverty traps implies that the poor are likely to be less productive than the rich because of 
inefficiency in the use of assets and resources. Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) show that in an 
agrarian economy this may lead to inefficiency in factor use as the poor use less than optimal 
levels of fertiliser and farm too intensively in terms of labour. Banerjee and Newman (1993) 
model the adverse growth impacts of asset inequalities in the presence of credit market 
imperfections. They show that the combination of initial inequality and market failures creates 
barriers to entry into profitable activities for those with limited assets. The barriers to entry 
inhibit the asset poor from accumulating human capital and climbing up the occupational 
ladder. Galor and Zeira (1993) show that credit market imperfections combine with 
indivisibilities in human capital investment to produce a dynamic equilibrium where 
individuals from asset-poor backgrounds are stuck in a low human capital equilibrium trap.  
 
Recent work in behavioural economics suggests that inequalities and poverty may reinforce 
themselves because of the way in which the disempowered make decisions (Banerjee and 
Mullainathan 2010; Shah et al. 2012). The basic idea of these models is that the poor and 
the deprived could escape deprivation by continually saving and investing. However, they are 
unable to do this because the deprived are either present-biased (too focused on temptation 
goods) (Banerjee and Mullainathan 2010) or their experience of life under conditions of 
scarcity can focus them on short-term firefighting rather than planning for the future.  
 
There is also research on geographic poverty traps that suggests a higher persistence of 
disempowerment in some places than others. These models argue that the attributes of a 
place, in particular its isolation, can restrain consumption from growing because isolation 
leads to multiple deprivations as well as limitations in access to technology (Jalan and 
Ravallion 2002; Kraay and McKenzie 2014). They show that geographic traps constitute an 
equilibrium because of the high costs of migration, which is an outcome of thin rural land 
markets and weak property rights. 
 
Insights from these models have had tremendous implications for international development 
agencies’ design of economic empowerment programmes that are increasingly being 
adopted by states in LICs. It is now well recognised by the protagonists of these programmes 
that the notion that the disempowered can overcome their deprivations through hard work 
and thrift alone is misplaced as markets are unlikely to allow sufficient prospects for mobility 
in LICs. These programmes also recognise that initial inequality matters not only for the 
persistence of deprivations but also for the efficiency with which the deprived use their 
resources. This directly impacts economic empowerment measured by the poor’s access to 
and control over assets and market resources. This suggests that the famous efficiency–
equity trade-off that traditional textbook economics argues is inherent in redistributive state 
interventions may not hold (Okun 1975). Instead, it implies that there may be no efficiency–
equity trade-off and well-designed redistributive interventions could simultaneously increase 
empowerment, efficiency, mobility and growth. These models argue that there is a 
compelling case for state redistribution and market correction policies. 
 
This research makes a case for introducing two broad categories of interventions to 
complement those designed at improving the access of deprived citizens to public services 
and infrastructure (Ghatak 2014; OECD 2012; Kabeer 2012). The first category aims to 
improve market access for the deprived by reducing transactions costs in a host of markets 
(e.g. microfinance), providing inputs which are not readily provided by the market (e.g. skills 
training and business development services), improving access to information, and reforming 
property rights (Ghatak 2014). The second category involves asset redistribution and 
transfers. It includes conditional and unconditional cash transfers, asset transfers, in-kind 
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transfers and access to subsidised employment. It is important to recognise that the 
proposed design gives primacy to interventions in the economic sphere. The expectation is 
that well-designed interventions in the economic sphere will not only have a positive impact 
on empowerment measured in terms of access to and control over assets, resources and 
opportunities; they are also likely to have spillover impacts on a broad range of 
empowerment indicators that relate to improvements in capabilities, security, control, power, 
agency, participation and influence.  
 
 
3 What does the evidence suggest?  
In this section I review the empirical evidence provided by quantitative studies on the impact 
of the following types of interventions: (1) microfinance, (2) skills training, (3) business 
development services, and (4) asset transfers. I focus on these interventions because donor, 
government and NGO support for economic empowerment tends to embody and allocate 
substantial funding to them (ILO 2014; OECD 2012; Kabeer 2012; Taylor and Pereznieto 
2014; Domingo 2013). 
 
To assess the impact of these interventions, I reviewed recent meta-evaluations and rigorous 
impact evaluations that employed quantitative methods. Impact evaluations were classified 
as rigorous if they used randomised controlled trial (RCT) methodology or used appropriate 
statistical techniques in quasi-experimental designs or panel-data analysis to minimise 
selection and omitted variable biases. I mainly focused on studies whose results have been 
published in peer-reviewed journals but also report the results of others that have been cited 
in the meta-evaluations. 
 
3.1 Theory of change  
Typical theories of change of economic empowerment programmes show dynamic and 
multifaceted change processes that reflect transformational changes in agency and 
economic advancement. Taylor and Pereznieto’s (2014) meta-evaluation provides examples 
of theories of change used by economic empowerment programmes. They show that typical 
theories of change map expected changes over the short, medium and long term. The short-
term impact of these interventions is expected to increase women’s access to the service, 
goods or opportunity that is being offered by the programme. This change is anticipated to 
occur at the individual or community level depending on how the intervention is designed.  
 
In the medium term, the intervention is expected to enhance: (1) individual capabilities and 
income, (2) economic decision-making power within the household and community,            
(3) access to and control over assets and income-generation activities, and (4) economic and 
social action. In the long term, the intervention continues providing medium-term outcomes 
and adds to them: (1) self-esteem, life satisfaction and self-belief; (2) economic mobility and 
the division of labour within the household and community; (3) entry into leadership positions 
in the community and the polity; (4) collective action in the community and the polity; and   
(5) active participation in community and political matters. The expectation of these 
programmes is that the sequence of change will flow from greater economic empowerment 
of the individual within the household, which will be followed by an increase in social and 
political empowerment in the community and the polity. Similarly, the sequence of change 
moves from the improvement of individuals’ economic capabilities and agency to an 
enhancement of their social and political agency and empowerment.  
 
3.2 The evidence: microfinance  
The evidence shows mixed results for the impact of finance on business start-up and 
survival. Four RCT evaluations that were part of the review find that microfinance enables 
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women to start new microenterprises, at least in the short to medium term (Augsburg et al. 
2012; Banerjee et al. 2014; Attanasio et al. 2011; Field et al. 2014). Two studies find 
negative impacts on both women’s and men’s business creation (Tarozzi et al. 2013; Karlan 
and Zinman 2011). However, like other recent meta-evaluations and reviews (Buvinic et al. 
2013; Mehra et al. 2013; Bandiera et al. 2013; ILO 2014) I find limited evidence that access 
to microfinance leads to sustained increases in profits and income for its beneficiaries. This 
suggests that economic empowerment is not being impacted by these programmes in the 
narrow sense of an increase in control over assets and income earning opportunities. 
 
More importantly for our purposes, none of the studies found that access to finance led to 
substantial increases in investment for girls’ education or impacted on other broader 
indicators of empowerment, such as decision-making autonomy. Women’s empowerment in 
these studies is measured in terms of female decision-making power within the household or 
in terms of having the agency to make independent decisions. Angelucci et al. (2015) find 
little positive statistical effect on empowerment in spite of finding significant effects on 
business growth in their treatment sample. Crépon et al. (2015) do not find any effect on 
empowerment in spite of significant effects on business revenue and investment.  
 
3.3 The evidence: skills training  
The skills training programmes that were evaluated either provide vocational training or what 
is classified as ‘business training’. The evidence suggests that there is some impact from 
training on start-ups. Premand et al. (2012) find participation in an entrepreneurship training 
programme leads to an increase in self-employment rates by 6 per cent for males and 3 per 
cent for females one year after its completion. Field et al. (2010) find heterogeneous impacts 
in India. They find that upper caste Hindu training graduates were 19 percentage points more 
likely to report that they were engaged in an income earning activity during the past week 
relative to the control group. They find that training had no effect on the relative income 
earning behaviour of lower caste Hindu women or on Muslim women. Premand et al. (2012) 
and de Mel et al. (2012a), however, find that short-term increases in self-employment after 
training are offset by a reduction in the likelihood of wage work. This implies that the net 
effect on the employment of trained graduates is close to zero.  
 
Similarly, very few studies detect a significant effect from training on business profits or 
sales. Only two studies find large and positive effects (de Mel et al. 2012 and Calderon et al. 
2012). However, de Mel et al. (2012a) do not find any impact of training on the profits of 
existing firms, but they do find a 40 per cent increase in profits for women-owned start-ups, 
although the confidence intervals around this estimate are wide. Calderon et al. (2013) find a 
24 per cent increase in weekly profits but the effects are marginally significant, and there is 
large attrition in their follow-up surveys so this estimate needs to be interpreted with caution. 
Some studies report a large and significant erosion of short-run gains in profits over time 
(Berge et al. 2015). Again this suggests that the impact of these programmes on economic 
empowerment in its narrowest sense is quite weak. 
 
Very few evaluations measure the impact of training on broader indicators of empowerment. 
Valdivia (2012) and Gravestejin (2012) measure the impact on women’s agency within the 
household and their decision-making capacity, however, both find little to no effect in the 
medium term. One evaluation that does find substantial effects from training on women’s 
empowerment is of an intervention in Uganda that combines vocational training with life skills 
training (information on sex, reproduction, and marriage) (Bandiera et al. 2012). It finds that 
relative to adolescents in the control communities, the intervention raises the likelihood of 
girls engaging in income generating activities and raises their expenditure on private 
consumption by 38 per cent. The study also finds that teenage pregnancy falls by 26 per cent 
and the share of girls reporting rape halves.  
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3.4 The evidence: business development services  
These programmes tend to combine two or more enterprise support activities – namely 
finance, business training, and ongoing technical assistance. I reviewed nine interventions 
(Berge et al. 2015; Blattman et al. 2013; Drexler et al. 2014; Fiala 2014; Gine and Mansuri 
2014; Klinger and Schündeln 2011; de Mel et al. 2012a; Gravesteijin 2012; Valdivia 2012). 
Three of these were explicitly targeted at women and all but one was aimed at micro 
entrepreneurs.  
 
The impact of these interventions on business growth is very mixed. Only three find positive 
effects on business growth (Blattman et al. 2013; de Mel et al. 2012; Valdivia 2012). 
However, both Blattman et al. (2013) and Valdivia (2012) find limited effects from providing 
business development services on women’s agency and decision-making. Blattman et al. 
(2013) do find some limited effects in terms of improving spousal communication. This 
suggests that the impact of these interventions on empowerment outcomes is likely to be 
small. 
 
3.5 The evidence: asset transfers  
There have been two waves of experimentation with asset transfer programmes. In the 
immediate aftermath of colonialism, enhancing the asset-base of the poor was viewed as a 
central strategy to relieve endemic poverty (Chenery et al. 1970). In what were largely 
agrarian economies at the time, this meant improving the terms on which the poor had 
access to land. As a result land reforms became an important instrument used by the state 
for asset redistribution in society. The current wave is taking the form of what are called ultra-
poor programmes (JPAL-MIT 2015). The objective of these programmes is to enable ultra-
poor households to diversify from insecure menial labour to self-employment. These 
programmes usually combine asset-transfers of livestock with skills training, consumption 
support, savings, home visits to build self-confidence, health education, and life skills 
training. The unit of intervention for these interventions is usually the household although 
sufficient safeguards are included for gender protection. This approach was innovated by 
BRAC and has since been adopted in eight countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Honduras, India, Pakistan and Peru) with support from the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP) and the Ford Foundation.  
 
I begin my analysis by providing evidence on the impact of ultra-poor programmes on 
empowerment. I then provide evidence on land reforms, which include pure land 
redistribution, tenancy reforms and titling programmes for the poor.  
 
3.5.1 Ultra-poor programmes 
The impact evaluations of ultra-poor programmes (Bandiera et al. 2013; Banerjee et al. 
2015) find that every measured economic outcome (consumption, food security, increase in 
assets, and revenue from paid activity) improved significantly relative to the control group two 
years after the programme ended. The evaluations also find that all economic outcomes saw 
similar gains a year after the programme ended, which suggests that there was no erosion in 
the gains between the two end lines. Ultra-poor household consumption increased by close 
to 5 per cent relative to the control. These gains were observed in all countries except 
Honduras. There was a significant increase in food consumption measured by a pooled 
index of food security, which increased by 0.11 standard deviations relative to the control. 
Again, these gains were observed in all countries except Pakistan and Peru. Total assets 
increased significantly in all countries except Honduras and Peru. There is also a 10 per cent 
increase in adult labour supply relative to controls, which is associated with a 35 per cent 
relative increase in revenue from self-employment. 
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However, with regard to women’s empowerment (measured as women having greater say in 
household decisions related to expenditure), the studies find a gain after the first year that 
has been eroded by the end of the second year. Interestingly, the erosion occurs in all eight 
countries. Contrary to this, the programme had a large and significant positive effect on all 
components of political empowerment (self-reported measures of the likelihood of 
involvement in political activity and community actions) except voting. It also reported 
significant results for psychosocial and physical wellbeing. 
 
3.5.2 Land reforms 
Besley and Burgess’ (2000) panel-data analysis for land reforms in India shows that these 
reforms are associated with significant reductions in rural poverty. Using the average number 
of land reforms implemented in India from 1958 to 1992 as their independent variable, they 
find that these reforms can explain a 10 per cent reduction in the all-India poverty gap during 
this period. They find stronger poverty reduction effects for tenancy reforms. The persistent 
inequalities literature suggests that these interventions also have the potential to enhance 
productivity (see Section 2). Banerjee et al. (2002) find a large and significantly positive 
effect on agricultural productivity in Indian states where tenancy reforms were successfully 
implemented. They find that tenancy reforms in West Bengal raised the average productivity 
of rice cultivation by 20 per cent.  
 
Taken together the evidence on land reforms and ultra-poor programmes suggests that 
economic empowerment programmes need not involve a trade-off between poverty and 
productivity as suggested by the persistent inequalities literature. It is clear that both 
interventions have a large and significant effect on economic empowerment and productivity 
outcomes. In spite of this success the literature on land reform highlights two major 
challenges for asset transfer programmes: (a) they may either create no ‘spillover effect’ or 
perverse ones for a broad set of women’s empowerment indicators, and (b) there may be 
tremendous heterogeneity in effective implementation by government and limited scale-up. 
 
In a recent paper Bhalotra et al. (2014) look at the impact of the West Bengal tenancy 
reforms (analysed by Banerjee et al. 2002) on gender discrimination in child health 
investments. They do find a significant decline in infant mortality risk in districts where 
tenancy reform was implemented on a wide scale. However, they find heterogeneity in infant 
survival that is related to the religion of the household and the gender composition of 
children. Specifically they find that boys’ survival rates increased far more than girls in Hindu 
families, which exhibit greater son preference than non-Hindu families.4 This difference is 
driven by the lack of improvement in survival rates among Hindu girls with firstborn older 
sisters who appear to face parental discrimination in child health investments. As a result, 
they find that the sex-ratio at age one is more male-biased after the reform in these families 
in spite of its impact on agricultural productivity and poverty reduction. These results seem to 
be driven by an interaction of male dominance in intergenerational land transfer and the 
social practice of exogamous marriage among West Bengali Hindu women, which weakens 
ties to their natal home. These findings are in line with the pioneering work of Agarwal 
(1994a, 1994b) which shows that women’s ownership of land in India is integrally tied to the 
inheritance norms followed by different communities. This suggests that the social context 
presents challenges for women’s empowerment even under conditions where economic 
outcomes are improving for poor and marginalised households. Seen in this light, the finding 
that ultra-poor programmes have no impact on measures of women’s decision-making 
autonomy is unsurprising.  
 
Another challenge is the effective implementation of high impact reforms across regions as 
well as their successful scale-up in the regional or national context. Again, the Indian 
example reveals that there is tremendous variation in effective implementation across Indian 
                                                 
4  Almond et al. (2013) also show that son-biased selection increased in China following land reform. 
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States (Besley and Burgess 2000; Joshi 1975; Ghatak and Roy 2007). The Task Force on 
the Agrarian Relations of the Planning Commission of India (India Planning Commission 
1973: 8) noted that: ‘The lack of political will is amply demonstrated by the large gaps 
between policy and legislation and between law and its implementation. In no sphere of 
public activity in our country since Independence has the hiatus between precept and 
practice, between policy pronouncements and actual execution been as great as in the 
domain of land reforms’. Ghatak and Roy (2007) show that the poverty reduction and 
productivity enhancement effects of land reform are contingent on their successful 
implementation. This raises the question: What factors can account for the variation in 
implementation? 
 
3.6 Summary: What the evidence suggests  
This section has reviewed the evidence on the effectiveness of economic interventions for 
empowerment. There are two key findings. Interventions that are aiming to provide market 
access for deprived citizens by reducing transactions costs for finance, labour and enterprise 
have weak and inconsistent impacts on fairly narrow indicators of economic empowerment. 
While none of the evaluations measured the impact on social and political action, a few 
studies did measure the impact on women’s decision-making autonomy in the household and 
found no effect. This is probably in part an outcome of design challenges, but it may also 
partly be a consequence of omitted contextual factors. 
 
Evidence suggests that asset redistribution interventions have a large impact on the 
economic indicators of beneficiaries. The access of beneficiaries to, and control over, assets 
and sustainable livelihoods increases, as does their food and consumption security, and 
psychosocial and physical wellbeing. There is also evidence of improvements in civic and 
political agency in some programmes. However, the ultra-poor programmes have no impact 
on women’s decision-making autonomy within the household. Importantly, evidence from 
India and China suggests that effectively implemented land reforms can worsen gender 
discrimination in spite of providing large gains in productivity and poverty reduction for poor 
and marginalised households. The land reform case suggests that evidence of successful 
impact does not guarantee successful scaling-up.  
 
These results have a number of implications. First, even successful economic empowerment 
programmes do not create the expected ‘spillover effects’ on broader indicators of 
empowerment and action even at the household level. This suggests that economic 
interventions by themselves may not be enough to improve empowerment and may need to 
be complemented with interventions in the social and political sphere. Indeed, the Uganda 
training intervention that did have a large impact combined training in economic and social 
skills (Bandiera et al. 2012). Second, the analysis indicates that the impact of economic 
empowerment interventions on broad indicators of empowerment is highly contingent on the 
context. The context clearly affects both successful implementation and scaling-up. It also 
affects the outcomes of economic interventions. 
 
 
4 The political and social context matter  
In what way does the political and social context matter? This section uses evidence from the 
political economy and development literature to illustrate that the success of economic 
empowerment interventions is affected by their social and political context. Success is 
defined as effective implementation of an intervention at all, or at scale, and its ability to 
move the prime economic empowerment outcomes in the predicted direction.  
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4.1 Empowering the poor: redistributive asset transfers through land reforms  
Section 3 alluded to the extensive heterogeneity in the implementation of land reforms 
across Indian states. What factors explain the success and failure of implementation across 
states? Besley and Burgess (2000) provide evidence on what explains the differential 
success of land reforms across Indian states during the period of 1958–92. They do this by 
regressing the stock of land reform legislation on a range of political and other variables. 
Their aim is to use the political variables as instruments for their land reform measure in 
order to address endogeneity concerns in their estimation of the reforms’ impact. They find 
that Congress administrations had a negative effect on the passage of the legislation. 
Unsurprisingly, left-wing administrations had a positive and significant effect. Conning and 
Robinson (2007) also find that in the case of Indian states the likelihood of land reforms is 
positively correlated with the political strength of peasantry, the proportion of population in 
non-rural areas and initial land inequality. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) use village-level 
data from West Bengal to show that land reform activity in the state is not only correlated 
with the share of seats held by left-wing parties in the state legislature; it is also correlated 
with the degree of political competition faced by them.  
 
The evidence shows that the success of these programmes is contingent on political 
collective action that increases the relative power of the peasantry. Tenancy reforms have 
been successful in contexts where left-wing parties have been able to consolidate power 
such as in West Bengal. Similar interventions, however, have been unsuccessful in contexts 
where mainstream parties are dominating the polity. The evidence also shows, however, that 
left-wing parties have been more responsive to their peasant base during periods of high 
political competition. This suggests that programme success not only requires a shift in the 
distribution of political power but also institutional conditions that create political competition. 
This evidence reveals the importance of the political context in determining the success of 
land reform legislation. 
 
Conning and Robinson (2007) formulate a theoretical model to explain the evolution of 
tenancy rights in Indian states. They argue that the evidence shows that the success of 
reforms is co-determined by the economic organisation of agriculture and the political 
environment. The latter factor accounts for the fact that tenancy rights are the endogenous 
outcome of collective political choices. In their model, landlord behaviour is influenced by 
anticipated challenges to their property rights. The model shows that under plausible 
assumptions, landowners may have an incentive to minimise the impact of the reforms on 
their properties by repossessing land from tenants. This may result in distorted equilibria with 
suppressed activity in both the land rental and land sales markets with landowners overusing 
land and tenant-labourers overusing labour. Conning and Robinson provide considerable 
historical evidence from Latin America on the use of pre-emptory eviction tactics by 
landlords. This suggests that endogenous political economy responses to public action that 
attempt to redistribute assets may create perverse outcomes that adversely affect 
programme success. It also suggests that programme theories of change must account for 
the relative distribution of political power and the possibility of pre-emptory responses by 
asset holders for distributive gains.  
 
4.2 Empowering women: closing the gender earnings gap  
Closing the gender-income gap is an important channel through which economic 
programmes aim to strengthen women’s empowerment and their ability to engage in social 
and political action. An important goal of programmes such as microfinance, skills transfer 
and support for the ultra-poor is to enable women’s access to and participation in secure 
occupations that offer better earnings prospects. The theories of change underpinning these 
programmes expect financial empowerment to have spillover effects on women’s safety. This 
is a narrow but fundamentally crucial indicator of empowerment. Criminologists and 
economists have proposed theories where an increase in women’s employment and/or 
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relative wages lowers the violence against them (Dugan et al. 1999; Pollak 2005; Aizer 
2007). The exposure reduction theory proposed by criminologists argues that increased 
employment will reduce violence by reducing the time partners spend together (Dugan et al. 
1999). Whereas economists argue that an increase in women’s relative wage increases her 
bargaining power and this lowers violence by enabling her alternative options (Pollak 2005; 
Aizer 2007). However, the sociological ‘male backlash’ theory argues that women’s financial 
independence may lead to increased violence against them in contexts where the culturally 
prescribed norm is male dominance and female dependence (Macmillan and Gartner 1999). 
In this view, empowerment measured as the protection from violence is predicated on the 
interaction between economic opportunities and social norms.  
 
Aizer (2007) shows that violence against women declined in the US between 1990 and 2003 
as their employment and earnings increased. An identification challenge in estimating a 
causal relationship between earnings and violence against women is the endogeneity 
between measures of wages and demand from female labour, which may be correlated with 
exposure to violence and/or unobservable factors related to violence. Aizer (2007) addresses 
this challenge by constructing a measure of wage that reflects exogenous demand for female 
and male labour. She finds causal evidence that the decline in the relative gender wage-gap 
during this period explains 9 per cent of the reduction in violence against women. Her 
evidence does not support the ‘male backlash’ theory or the exposure reduction theory. In 
the latter case it is because reductions in violence occur during non-working hours. This 
evidence provides strong support for interventions in the economic sphere that aim to narrow 
the male-female earnings gap. 
 
Contrary to this, however, a number of studies from India show that an increase in female 
labour income or an increase in their relative income position within the household increases 
violence and/or the threat of violence against them (Luke and Munshi 2011; Eswaran et al. 
2013; Eswaran and Malhotra 2011). Amaral et al. (2015) find that increased female labour 
force participation following the establishment of the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (NREGS) increased total gender-based violence including kidnappings, sexual 
harassment and domestic violence. Eswaran and Malhotra (2011) find that working women 
face greater spousal violence and those working away from home face even more violence. 
The policy conclusion reached by them is that empowering women through better 
employment opportunities may be accompanied by increased spousal violence. This is in 
stark contrast to the conclusion reached by Aizer (2007). 
 
What accounts for these heterogeneous impacts across the two contexts? Luke and Munshi 
(2011) suggest that differences in social norms may provide an explanation. Their study of 
tea plantations in South India shows that conditional on total household income, an increase 
in female income increases the probability of marital violence. They find that this effect only 
exists among lower castes, who have weaker norms against exogamy and mobility relative to 
other castes. They show that a relative increase in female income among lower castes, leads 
to behaviour that weakens the family’s ties to the ancestral community and results in women 
responding to earnings opportunities and challenging the norm of male decision-making. This 
is dealt with through increased violence. Other castes, however, who maintain endogamous 
relations, have a more muted response to opportunities and do not challenge male authority. 
Another factor that may explain the heterogeneous impacts is the difference in criminal 
justice effectiveness against violence between the US and India. These examples suggest 
that the impact of economic empowerment on women’s overall empowerment will depend 
crucially on the interaction between economic opportunities, social norms and legal 
institutions. 
 
Both Eswaran and Malhotra (2011) and Luke and Munshi (2011) argue that these findings 
make sense if the underlying model of bargaining assumes a non-cooperative instead of a 
cooperative framework. In latter models bargaining is a cooperative endeavour and hence 
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the outcome is Pareto efficient. In the non-cooperative framework, however, violence is an 
effective means to obtain distributional advantage in bargaining situations as there is hardly 
any effective legal recourse against it (Farmer and Tiefenthaler 1997; Bloch and Rao 2002). 
In these models economic empowerment interventions may result in perverse outcomes 
unless they are accompanied by interventions that provide security for battered women and 
better legal protection against domestic violence. These models also suggest that 
endogenous behavioural responses by abusers to public action that aims to enhance 
economic opportunities may result in disempowering rather than empowering women. Again, 
we need a theory of change that takes into account retaliatory responses for distributional 
gain under specific norms and institutional conditions. 
 
4.3 Empowering the poor: strengthening the right to unforced labour  
An important objective of economic empowerment programmes has been to strengthen the 
poor’s, and women’s in particular, right to own-labour by removing legal and social 
restrictions on labour mobility. Agricultural slavery (Fogel and Engerman 1974; Wright 2006) 
and serfdom (Brenner 1976; Domar and Machina 1984) are important institutions that have 
historically placed significant restrictions on labour mobility. In LICs the institution of bonded 
or forced labour imposes serious restrictions on labour mobility (Bardhan 1983; Mukherjee 
and Ray 1995). In spite of the prohibition against slavery under the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, it persists across the world. ILO (2012) has documented that 
21 million people around the world are victims of forced labour with the incidence being 
particularly high in Asia and Africa. There is considerable evidence that forced labour takes 
on the form of involuntary and voluntary debt-bondage (Genicot 2009). There is a 
commitment within the international community to deal with this challenge through the 
passage of legislation, strengthening prosecution, increasing awareness that this is a 
criminal practice, and economic support (HM Government 2014). These measures aim to 
increase economic and social empowerment through changes in the legal framework. 
 
A stream of literature in development has argued that debt-bondage can sometimes permit 
Pareto-improving outcomes that may not have occurred otherwise. The argument is that 
debt-bondage enables asset-poor citizens to gain access to credit and insurance, which they 
will not be able to get from the market (Bardhan 1983; Mukherjee and Ray 1995). This would 
suggest that placing restrictions on forced labour could make families without assets worse 
off. However, a body of literature shows that in the presence of incomplete markets, banning 
forced labour contracts can improve welfare. Genicot (2002) shows that a ban on bonded 
labour can stimulate new credit market opportunities for families without assets. Basu (2003) 
argues that legalising bonded labour could lead to an over-supply of bonded labourers, 
forcing down their wages. Similarly, Conning and Kevane (2006) show that the existence of 
bonded labour may create incentives for employers to collude on low wages.  
 
What is the evidence on the effectiveness of a legal ban on forced labour? Does it lead to the 
empowerment of citizens who were subject to forced labour before the ban? These questions 
can be answered by learning from the evidence on the abolition of slavery in the Southern 
United States. During the antebellum period, the South was one of the poorest regions in the 
US with income per capita at 70 per cent of the national average GDP per capita (Easterlin 
1960; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). There is no evidence of any convergence after the 
abolition of slavery in 1865. In fact, until the 1940s the income per capita in the South 
remained at about half of the US average. Historical evidence also shows that the abolition of 
slavery was replaced by a variety of forced labour contracts that tied labour to land in 
exchange for access to protection, credit and insurance (Alston and Ferrie 1999; Ransom 
and Sutch 2001). Why did the abolition of slavery and the enfranchisement of freed slaves 
not lead to the decline of forced labour institutions? 
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Acemoglu and Robinson (2008a, 2008b) argue that the persistence of these institutions 
cannot be explained by their relative economic efficiency (see also Wright 1986; Ransom 
and Sutch 2001). Instead, they explain the persistence of forced labour institutions through 
the persistence of de facto economic and political power and de jure political power in the 
hands of the antebellum white elite (see also Wiener 1978). This power enabled the state 
legislature of Alabama to pass the Black Code which included a vagrancy law and a law 
against the enticement of labourers. Naidu (2010) finds that in the wake of the civil war, all 
southern states apart from Tennessee strengthened these laws and enticement became a 
criminal offence punishable by fines. He provides evidence showing that the anti-enticement 
laws did in fact bind sharecroppers in statistically and economically significant ways: these 
laws lowered the probability of a labour market move by 12 per cent and the returns to 
experience for black workers by 0.6 per cent per annum.  
 
This example suggests that public action that aims to reform economic institutions through 
legislation may result in perverse outcomes if the distribution of de facto economic power and 
de jure and de facto political power remain in the hands of the elite that benefited from these 
institutions. Again, we find that the success of specific economic interventions is predicated 
on the relationship between legal changes, economic empowerment and social and political 
power. This example shows that abolition of forced labour may not have the effects expected 
because of the lack of spillover benefits for social and political empowerment. 
  
4.4 Empowering the poor: strengthening property rights  
Disempowered citizens not only lack access to secure jobs and market opportunities, but 
they also lack access to, and control over, assets with which to generate income, access 
markets and obtain secure shelter. Weak property rights are a significant factor in this 
respect, affecting economic empowerment by increasing expropriation risk, which may 
reduce incentives for investment and effort (Besley and Ghatak 2010). They also increase 
enforcement and protection costs for resource and asset-poor individuals with adverse 
consequences for economic empowerment. Weak property rights also reduce people’s 
access to credit and land markets (Besley 1995). Strengthening property rights to agricultural 
land and residential land in urban and rural areas is an important component of economic 
empowerment programmes. Again, these measures are aiming to increase economic and 
social empowerment through changes in the legal framework. Section 3 reviewed the 
empirical evidence and found that these interventions have had a positive effect on economic 
empowerment in many contexts. Is there a relationship between the political environment 
and the evolution of the economic institutions of property? 
 
It is well-recognised that land rights in weakly institutionalised LIC settings are not 
consolidated in the forms of exclusive individual or corporate control comparable to notions 
of private property in the advanced economies (Berry 1993; Goldstein and Udry 2008; Khan 
2009). For example, Goldstein and Udry (2008) document the complex structure of land 
rights in rural Ghana (also see Besley 1995). They find that most of the land cultivated by 
farmers is under the control of a village chief and is allocated through matrilineage. The 
general principle is that land is ‘owned’ by the social institution of the paramount ‘chieftaincy’ 
and is controlled by a particular matrilineage. However, the control of the matrlineage is 
conditional on its members meeting their obligations as subjects of the chieftaincy. This 
results in overlapping claims to land and allocation being decided on the basis of an 
individual’s political influence and perceived need. Khan (2009) documents the complex 
structure of land rights in colonial South Asia that has persisted in the post-colonial period. 
He argues that politically and socially mediated non-market mechanisms for property rights 
allocations – including informal ones – play a much more important role than market-
mediated and formal mechanisms.  
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This creates a complex web of rights that are mediated through informal social and political 
institutions. Goldstein and Udry (2008) show that in this context local power structures play 
an important role in affecting economic empowerment through the security of property rights. 
They also show that the earnings of producers are impacted by political power as it is the 
main foil against expropriation of effort and incentives. In Ghana, fallowing is the most 
important investment in land productivity and Goldstein and Udry’s evidence shows that the 
amount of fallowing in their sample is extremely inefficient. This is because fallowing 
increases the risk of confiscation of land by the chiefs and individuals connected to them. 
They show that individuals with political power have much higher levels of fallowing because 
they face a lower risk of expropriation. It is evident that introducing economic interventions 
that incentivise producers, in this context, to leave their land fallow will lead to economic 
disempowerment of the less powerful as they will be exposed to higher rates of expropriation 
of assets and effort. This example suggests that theories of change underlying economic 
empowerment interventions must account for the interaction between the structure of 
economic rights, informal social and political institutions and the distribution of local power. 
Failure to do so could result in perverse effects. It also suggests that careful work is needed 
to map the correspondence between formal and informal institutions and the rights assigned 
to individuals. 
 
There is a vast literature which suggests that weak property rights for the disempowered may 
not only be an outcome of the way non-state institutions and actors function but also the way 
the state functions (Besley and Ghatak 2010; Khan 2009; North 1990; Acemoglu et al. 2005). 
This is because property right structures are collective choices of society. The literature 
suggests that property rights not only determine the productive potential of society – thereby 
opening up the opportunity for Pareto optimal trades – but also offer different distribution of 
gains for different individuals and social groups. This results in a conflict of interest over the 
choice of property right. The literature contends that the distribution of political power will be 
the deciding factor in determining the system of property rights (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2008a and Khan 2009). Evidence suggests that relative power is shaped by the type of 
political institutions, which determine de jure power. It also shows the importance of the 
distribution of organisational and political power of different groups that enable them to 
participate in political institutions and define the distribution of de facto power (Khan 2009; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2008a). 
 
4.5 Summary: Political and social context matters  
This section uses evidence from the literature to show that public action for economic 
empowerment can have diametrically opposite outcomes in different social and political 
contexts. Why does the context matter? The evidence suggests it matters for two reasons. 
First, in weakly institutionalised LIC settings the structure of economic rights is complex and 
often embedded in informal social and political arrangements and institutions that may or 
may not have formal recognition. Second, economic empowerment interventions attempt to 
change the distribution of resources, assets and power between the disempowered and the 
empowered. These distributional changes can manifest themselves within households, 
communities and the polity. Therefore, public action for economic empowerment by its very 
nature involves complex negotiations in the social and political sphere. It also results in 
endogenous political economy responses from agents who see their economic and political 
rents threatened or see an opportunity to increase their rents.  
 
This suggests that there are social costs of creating, sustaining and scaling-up these 
interventions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008a). These costs include the cost of social agents 
negotiating the intervention and contesting it in the social and political spheres (Khan 2009). 
The examples suggest that high social costs could result in the persistence of the initial 
empowerment equilibrium or could worsen it. The evidence also suggests that these social 
costs are a function of the distribution of political and organisational power in society, which 
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is affected by political and social institutions, action and norms. The interaction between 
economic interventions and the social and political context tends to be complex, non-linear 
and can bring about unintended consequences (McGee and Gaventa 2011). I have shown 
that changing outcomes positively in one sphere – say, economic – may lead to worsening 
outcomes in social and political spheres.  
 
The design of interventions, therefore, must be informed by theories of change that build a 
systematic understanding of how economic interventions (mechanisms) will combine with 
social and political factors (context) to create programme success. These theories of change 
must take into account the possibility of distributive conflicts and involve features that enable 
programmes to take into account endogenous political economy responses to interventions 
by both gainers and losers in specific LIC contexts. A robust theory of change must also 
recognise that economic interventions are one of many potential drivers and change in 
economic empowerment may also result from self-standing or complementary interventions 
in the social and political spheres. For example, tenancy reforms in West Bengal would not 
have been possible without the political changes preceding it. 
 
 
5 What aspects of context matter?  
This section synthesises the political economy literature and identifies features of political 
action and the institutional context in LICs that the literature suggests may affect economic 
empowerment outcomes. I show that these features affect outcomes by impacting 
accountability, political selection, inclusive representation, and conflict. I also analyse the 
evidence on inequality as a channel that affects economic empowerment. The literature also 
shows that the preferences of voters and their information environment are important 
determinants of their ability for action and their ability to influence selection and hold leaders 
accountable. I focus on the political context with an interest in the effect of economic 
empowerment interventions that reach a critical scale enabling them to have systemic 
impact. 
 
5.1 Political action and economic empowerment: the role of political 
institutions  
The economic history literature suggests that strengthening democratic accountability 
through political institutional reform is an important pathway underpinning effective public 
action for empowerment. The literature suggests that political institutions that disenfranchise 
citizen groups worsen their access to public services. Carruthers and Wanamaker (2015) 
examine the effect of women’s suffrage in the American South in a context of continuing 
disenfranchisement of black citizens. They find that female voter enfranchisement accounted 
for a one-third rise in public expenditure on schooling from 1920 to 1940. However, they also 
show that this rise was disproportionately targeted at white schools, which worsened racial 
inequality and human capital outcomes and resulted in the continued economic 
disempowerment of the black population. Similarly, Miller (2008) finds that the electoral 
enfranchisement of women in the US was followed by radical shifts in legislation and a rise in 
public health spending. He shows that as a result of women’s enfranchisement child mortality 
declined by 8–15 per cent.  
 
The political economy literature also finds that political institutions in LICs that strengthen the 
re-election incentives of politicians have a positive impact on the outcome of economic 
empowerment interventions and on effective service delivery. De Janvary et al. (2012) find 
that the re-election incentives of elected mayors that resulted from variations in term limits 
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affected the performance of a conditional cash transfer programme5 in Brazil. They find that 
while the programme reduced school dropout rates by 8 per cent; its impact was 36 per cent 
more in electoral districts governed by mayors who faced re-election. They also find that 
mayors with a good performance record increased their re-election probability. Similarly, 
Ferraz and Finan (2011) show that in Brazil stronger re-election incentives (measured by the 
number of terms a mayor has been elected) reduce corruption in public service delivery and 
improve outcomes. The pathway to improved outcomes in these examples is stronger 
political accountability. 
 
However, there is a paucity of rigorous empirical evidence on the mechanisms and 
contextual factors that enable disempowered citizens to hold leaders accountable in non-
democratic settings. Evidence shows that there is huge variation in the performance of 
autocracies (Besley and Kudamatsu 2008). However, our understanding of the processes 
underlying this variation is limited and much more research is needed to unpack the 
mechanisms that underlie it. In particular, it is important to understand the role of 
spontaneous politics, public protests, ‘revolutions’ and non-electoral checks and balances as 
mechanisms for citizen empowerment in these contexts. There are a few empirical papers on 
the effectiveness of these mechanisms (Aidt and Jensen 2014; Acemoglu et al. 2011) but 
much more work is needed. 
 
5.2 Political action and economic empowerment in LICs: ethnic politics, 
clientelism and the limits to democratic accountability  
A paradox in LICs is that while the overall distribution of political institutions has shifted 
towards those that allow greater political engagement among poorer and less educated 
citizens, a majority of citizens question the fairness and integrity of these institutions 
(Khemani 2016). Khemani (ibid.: 60) shows that Wave 6 (2010–14) of the World Values 
Survey reveals ‘a high degree of perceived incidence of violence, vote buying, and electoral 
fraud in developing countries, in sharp contrast to the lack of such problems reported in 
OECD countries’. This suggests that changes in formal political institutions may not be 
sufficient to ensure that distributive conflicts over resources and rents is decided in favour of 
the disempowered. Evidence suggests that forms of political action such as ethnic politics 
and clientelism underpin violence, vote buying and electoral fraud, which have adverse 
consequences for economic empowerment. 
 
The literature shows that ethnic politics is an important form of political action in LICs. Azulai 
et al. (2014: 38–40) show that an important feature of the LIC context is the much higher 
degree of ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation that gives rise to ethnic politics. There is a 
large literature that has documented the tendency of groups to mobilise politically around 
identity to appropriate targeted benefits often using strategies that involve violence (Burgess 
et al. 2015; Bates 2000; Banerjee and Pande 2007; Varshney 2002; Birnir 2006; Chandra 
and Wilkinson 2008; Chandra 2004, 2012).  
 
The evidence suggests that ethnic politics undermines public action for empowerment by 
weakening the accountability of leaders mandated to provide public goods and inclusive 
market opportunities. Burgess et al. (2015) show that districts in Kenya with a population 
majority sharing the president’s ethnicity, received twice as much expenditure on roads and 
four times higher paved road provision during the period 1963–2011. Miguel and Gugerty 
(2005) find that local ethnic diversity is robustly associated with a sharp drop in local school 
funding in Kenya. The drop in local school funding associated with median school-level 
ethnic diversity is approximately 30 per cent of average local school funding. Banerjee and 
Pande (2007) show that ethnic and caste mobilisation is associated with greater corruption in 
the delivery of public services in India. The underlying cause of these outcomes is weak 
                                                 
5  This is also an important intervention used by economic empowerment programmes. 
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political accountability of leaders to citizens who are not co-ethnics. Alesina et al.’s (2012) 
findings show that inequality between ethnicities is not only correlated with lower public good 
provision, it is also correlated with perceptions of discrimination. 
 
The evidence suggests that adverse effects of ethnic politics on empowerment are a 
consequence of ethnic conflict and actions that weaken political selection. Ksoll et al. (2014) 
find that ethnic electoral conflict in Kenya during 2008 reduced weekly export volumes by   
40 per cent. They found that on average firms suffered a loss during this period and absent 
workers suffered welfare losses at least three times more than weekly earnings. Hjort (2014) 
finds that firm-level adjustment to this shock involved a sharp increase in ethnic 
discrimination within supply chains (see also Varshney 2002). The ethnicity-based 
disempowerment equilibrium can also operate through the selection of leaders. Aidt et al. 
(2011) show that political parties in India that are organised on ethnic lines are also likely to 
field candidates who are subject to serious criminal allegations. Prakash et al. (2014) find 
that the election of criminally accused politicians in the Indian context results in a 24 per cent 
drop in economic activity.  
 
There is evidence that ethnic political divisions are not predetermined but are often 
manipulated by politicians for gain. Padro-i-Miguel (2007) highlights a mechanism whereby 
politicians target interventions endogenously in order to create conflicts of interest among co-
ethnics. This could happen, for example, by targeting resources and goods to co-ethnics 
(Padro-i-Miguel 2007). Leaders have an incentive to do this if it gives them a better chance to 
win power and also increase their private rents by excluding other groups from the provision 
of public services. Eifert et al. (2010) show that when the Afrobarometer survey is run close 
to elections, citizens tend to identify more strongly with ethnic markers. A significant 
implication of this mechanism is that the expectation of sustaining power and rents drives 
political action that worsens ethnic-based discrimination and disempowerment.  
 
There is a growing corpus of literature from LICs which documents how the political rights of 
voters, especially the disempowered, and their access to public goods and redistributive 
transfers is undermined by clientelist political action (Stokes 2011; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2008; Stokes et al. 2013; Schaffer 2007; Khan 2000). Stokes (2011: 2) defines clientelism as 
‘the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of 
distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?’ The literature 
acknowledges that clientelism can come with an offer of inducement or intimidation (Stokes 
et al. 2013; Tam 2005; Chubb 1982), and it can involve outright vote buying or patronage 
(Stokes 2011). Scott (1972) argues that clientelism is usually between a powerful patron and 
a client of lower socioeconomic status. The literature finds widespread prevalence of 
clientelism in LICs even under democratic political institutions which use secret ballots in 
elections. It suggests that clientelism is prevalent in contexts where market imperfections 
reduce the access of the client to protection, economic and social services and goods. While 
the client lacks resources to enter market transactions, she has certain other resources: like 
abundant time, a vote, and access to social networks, which are available to offer to the 
patron as part of the clientelist exchange (Stokes 2011). Wantchekon’s (2003) experimental 
research in Africa shows that leaders have strong incentives for using clientelist campaigns 
and mobilisation to sustain power. 
 
The evidence suggests that clientelism undermines public action for empowerment by 
weakening the ability of the state to provide public goods and successfully implement 
economic empowerment programmes. Anderson et al.’s (2015) findings show that clientelism 
between landowning elites and lower class agrarian households in India results in lower 
public investment in social safety nets and anti-poverty programmes.6 Khemani (2015) shows 
that vote buying in the Philippines is associated with lower provision of broadly delivered pro-
                                                 
6  These are two important components of economic empowerment programmes.  
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poor public services in health and education. She also finds that the incidence of vote buying 
is correlated with a higher incidence of wasting among children. Larreguy (2013) shows that 
stronger clientelist networks in Mexico are associated with lower public school provision. 
Again, clientelism undermines outcomes by weakening electoral accountability.  
 
This evidence suggests that economic empowerment interventions are likely to have 
attenuated outcomes in LIC contexts dominated by ethnic and clientelist politics. In these 
contexts, political interventions designed to mitigate the adverse consequences of ethnic and 
clientelist politics may be important pre-conditions for the success of economic 
empowerment actions and programmes. 
 
5.3 Political action and economic empowerment in LICs: interventions to 
mitigate the adverse consequences of ethnic and clientelist politics  
Evidence suggests that reforms in the political sphere may mitigate the adverse effects of 
ethnic politics on empowerment. Burgess et al. (2015) and Casey (2015) provide evidence 
that the introduction of political institutions that strengthen checks and balances through 
electoral competition in sub-Saharan Africa helped overcome the distortions in public action 
caused by ethnic politics. Burgess et al.’s (2015) study on Kenya finds no evidence of ethnic 
favouritism in provision during periods of democracy. Casey (2015) finds that local elections 
helped to erode ethnic and partisan loyalties in politics in Sierra Leone.  
 
There is also evidence that suggests that enforcing minority political rights through inclusive 
political institutions and creating mechanisms for checks and balances may offset the 
exclusionary consequences of ethnic politics. Pande (2003) evaluates the impact of caste 
reservation for local government mayors in India and finds that states which reserved the 
office of local mayor for lower caste groups increased spending on public education 
programmes benefitting lower caste citizens. However, Munshi and Rozensweig (2015) show 
that the positive impact of political reservation on the outcomes of economic empowerment 
programmes and actions is sensitive to the demographic distribution of ethnic groups in 
electoral constituencies.  
 
The literature also suggests that changes in voting technology, again a reform in the political 
sphere, positively impacts empowerment by undermining the consequences of clientelist 
action. There is a recognition that as clientelism does not involve simultaneous exchange, it 
requires monitoring mechanisms that enforce agreements between patron and clients 
(Stokes 2011; Larreguy 2013). An important mechanism sustaining clientelism is the 
absence of anonymous voting. The literature suggests that reforms in the political sphere 
that strengthen anonymous voting can have positive empowerment effects by eroding 
clientelism. The classic paper providing evidence for this mechanism is Baland and Robinson 
(2008), who show that the introduction of the secret ballot in Peru was associated with the 
erosion of clientelism and better economic outcomes for the landless. Similarly, Fujiwara 
(2015) shows that the introduction of electronic voting in Brazil enfranchised disempowered 
voters, undermined clientelist action, and improved the delivery of health services. 
 
There is emerging evidence that empowerment interventions in the economic sphere may 
also be effective in undermining the consequences of clientelist action. Larreguy et al. (2015) 
shows that a land titling programme in Mexico was able to reduce clientelism, while at the 
same time rewarding the federal political party responsible for implementing the programme. 
Their findings suggest that economic empowerment interventions can erode clientelism and 
at the same time create strong political incentives for the sustainable implementation of the 
intervention. They also show that there is a strong symbiotic relationship between lack of 
property rights and clientelism in urban Mexico as political brokers at the municipal level offer 
protection against eviction in exchange for votes. The land titling programme reduced vote 
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selling by reducing the demand for property rights protection. The recipients of the land titling 
also experienced improved access to public goods and a positive net wealth effect. 
 
5.4 Political action and economic empowerment: the role of inequality  
There is considerable evidence that shows that the relationship between institutions, political 
selection and public action for empowerment is mediated by inequality. However, the 
evidence is mixed on what type of inequality matters. Nunn (2008) uses information from the 
US 1860 census to analyse the relationship between historic inequality and current economic 
inequality and development. He shows that historically unequal counties in the US also had a 
much higher incidence of slavery, suggesting that inequality was directly related to 
disempowerment in this context. The study finds a positive relationship between historic and 
current economic inequality, but it does not find an empirical relationship between historic 
inequality and current income levels. Acemoglu et al. (2008) find that in Colombian 
municipalities there is a positive relationship between nineteenth century land inequality and 
current rates of primary and secondary school enrolment. As opposed to this, Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997, 2002) and Banerjee and Iyer (2005) find that unequal economic institutions 
adversely impact economic outcomes that are likely to impact the disempowered. While the 
evidence on the relationship between economic inequality and public action for 
empowerment is ambiguous, there is emerging evidence that shows that political inequality 
leads to poor outcomes. Acemoglu et al. (2008) show that political inequality in Colombian 
municipalities is negatively correlated with economic inequality and schooling outcomes.  
 
There is evidence that elite political control over institutions of violence and coercion can 
weaken access to political power for the disempowered and worsen their development 
outcomes. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 2008b) and Acemoglu et al. (2013) document the 
presence of elite capture of state institutions in the US South in spite of the extension of 
voting rights. They show that in these contexts political elites maintained power through the 
widespread use of violence, coercion and economic sanctions and this worsened outcomes 
for the disempowered. Acemoglu et al. (2014) focus on variations in the colonial organisation 
of chieftaincy in Sierra Leone, to show that areas with fewer ruling families face fewer 
constraints and less political competition, and also have worse rates of educational 
attainment, child health and asset ownership. 
 
5.5 Political action and empowerment: voter preferences and the information 
environment in LICs  
Recent evidence suggests that voter preferences may not behave in ways suggested by 
conventional political economy models. For example, Chapman (2014) finds mixed results 
for increases in municipal spending on clean water and sewer systems in response to the 
extension of voter franchise in nineteenth century England. Standard political economy 
models would suggest that an extension in voter franchise would be associated with greater 
public spending on water and sanitation as the poor stood to gain most from this investment. 
However, Chapman (2014) found a U-shaped relationship between the expansion of the 
franchise and public spending, with expenditure per capita peaking at intermediate levels of 
the franchise. He suggests that this was because the expenditure was financed through 
property taxes, which meant that the poor had to share the fiscal burden of provision with the 
rich. This suggests that the poor’s support for redistributive policies and public good provision 
is predicated on how the distribution of the tax burden is imposed and what is the perceived 
tax burden they may face.  
 
This finding is related to an empirical puzzle that democracies, where the median voter is 
typically poorer than the mean, have lower tax rates than is predicted by the standard 
Meltzer and Richard (1981) model. This could be explained by the use of distortionary taxes, 
which are likely to lower the incentive of the poor to vote for provision. It could also be a 
result of the complex nature of preference formation among the poor and disempowered. 
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Bénabou and Ok (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) show that there is considerable 
variation in the preferences for redistribution within lower classes. They show that poor 
citizens with higher prospects of upward economic mobility prefer lower levels of 
redistribution. Luttmer and Singhal (2011) find that within European countries, immigration 
from countries with higher preferences for redistribution typically maintain this higher 
preference, and this effect persists over much more than a decade. There is emerging 
evidence that the media is a powerful means for shaping voter preferences towards both 
state programmes and other groups in society (Paluck and Green 2009; Trujillo and Paluck 
2011). This suggests that there is need for rigorous empirical research that provides a better 
understanding of voter preferences in specific contexts.  
 
The literature also suggests that the accountability of political leaders to disempowered 
citizens in democracies may be weakened because the latter lack the information to hold 
them accountable. Classical models of democratisation predict that informed voters can and 
will hold politicians accountable for their performance. Knowing this, politicians will become 
more responsive to the interests of disempowered voters. The evidence on how voters 
respond to information provision is, however, mixed. Ferraz and Finan (2011) show that 
voters penalise corruption when information about its practice is revealed. Banerjee et al. 
(2011) find that voter information campaigns increase turnout and reduce vote selling. 
However, Humphreys and Weinstein (2010) fail to find a relationship between information 
and accountability in Uganda. Chong et al. (2013) find that information provided on fraud can 
lower turnouts, resulting in citizen disengagement. There is also emerging evidence that the 
effectiveness of information as an instrument that shapes voter preference and strengthens 
accountability is predicated on the medium through which it is disseminated. Television and 
radio have been shown to have significant effects on people’s preferences and attitudes (e.g. 
Paluck 2009; Jensen and Oster 2009), and they are shown to be particularly effective in 
contexts with low literacy rates and a strong oral tradition.  
 
5.6 Summary: What aspects of context matters for empowerment? 
The review of literature suggests that a combination of the political institutional context and 
features of political action matter for empowerment outcomes. These contextual factors 
appear to affect the effectiveness of public action for empowerment as well as the outcomes 
of economic empowerment interventions. The economic history and political economy 
literature suggests, on the one hand, that the transition to political institutions that strengthen 
democratic accountability is an important pathway that positively impacts empowerment, but 
on the other hand the available evidence suggests that ethnic and clientelist political action, 
which is highly prevalent in LICs, undermines this impact. This is an important facet of the 
democratic challenge in LICs. 
 
Ethnic and clientelist political action limits democratic accountability by weakening political 
accountability and selection, and engendering conflict. This, in turn, weakens the effects of 
economic empowerment interventions as well as public action for empowerment. The 
literature indicates that we should expect heterogeneous outcomes of public action and 
programmes for empowerment with implementation and returns being higher where the 
constraints imposed by ethnic and clientelist political action are weaker. However, we need 
much more evidence on the contextual factors that lead to the erosion of ethnic and 
clientelist action in some sub-national settings as compared to others. The literature also 
suggests that political interventions and reforms designed to mitigate the adverse 
consequences of ethnic and clientelist action may be important for empowerment, and that 
there is a case for designing interventions that extend across the economic and political 
spheres.  
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6 What are the implications for fragile and 
conflict-affected settings (FCAS)?  
I draw on the broader political economy and development literature to examine the 
implications for FCAS as there have been few rigorous, well-defined evaluations of economic 
empowerment programmes in these settings (Blattman and Ralston 2015). I begin by 
describing the salient features of FCAS and their implications for economic empowerment 
programmes. I then review the findings of the nascent empirical literature on economic 
empowerment programmes in FCAS. I argue that while the nascent literature implies that 
contextual factors do matter, it pays them little heed. Finally, I draw on the previous sections 
to suggest future directions for programming and research on action for empowerment in 
FCAS. 
 
6.1 What are the features of FCAS? 
FCAS contexts are defined as having weak institutions, high risk of coups or other political 
instability, ongoing or recently resolved conflicts, and unstable policy environments (Blattman 
and Ralston 2015; Woolcock 2014). In addition, they are vulnerable to internal and external 
shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters. In such insecure contexts, the rule of 
law is likely to be highly uncertain and the return to any factor of production is unlikely to be 
high or stable. In contexts with ongoing uncertainty and instability, incentives to accumulate 
any form of capital are likely to be too low and too risky for most individuals and firms, except 
for those with power and stability. However, the returns to factors of production may be very 
high in FCAS regions where settlements have been reached, the powerful are able to 
provide property rights protection, or where uncertainty has recently been resolved and 
stability restored. Economic empowerment programmes are expected to increase economic 
returns for the marginalised in these types of FCAS contexts, by not only increasing 
employability and raising income, but also incentivising people to disengage from conflict and 
violence (Blattman and Ralston 2015; Blattman and Miguel 2010).  
 
FCAS are also defined by a political context in which states either don’t have a monopoly 
over violence or there are few constraints on executive power; groups organise to offer 
protection to their members; security for elites is typically higher than that available for non-
elites; and access to resources, public goods and protection for non-elites is negotiated 
through participation in social and political groups (North et al. 2007). There is ample 
evidence that in these settings social and political groups organise on the basis of ethnic 
affiliation or clientelist action (ibid.). In this context, public action for empowerment is going to 
be affected by the ability of social groups to reach peaceful settlements. The outcomes of 
public action will also depend on how accountable and responsive the leadership of social 
and political groups is to their non-elite members and whether these groups can place 
effective checks on executive power.  
 
6.2 Evidence on the impact of economic empowerment programmes in FCAS 
What is the evidence for the effectiveness of economic empowerment programmes in these 
contexts? Blattman and Ralston’s (2015) comprehensive review shows that capital-centric 
interventions appear to offer the most promise, in the sense that these programmes can 
stimulate self-employment and earnings cost-effectively. These interventions include start-up 
grants, cash infusions and in-kind asset transfers. Their review also finds that, as in the 
broader LIC case, microfinance promises low returns in terms of economic outcomes and 
skills, and business training programmes rarely pass a simple cost-benefit test unless they 
are bundled with capital-centric programmes. The review also finds that capital-centric 
programmes tend to be the exception rather than the rule in spite of considerable evidence 
for their success in LIC settings and some emerging evidence for their success in FCAS 
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(Blattman et al. 2015, 2016; de Mel et al. 2012b; Gilligan et al. 2012). The FCAS results 
show that the programme returns are highest either in moderately war-affected districts, or 
once people have returned from forced displacement in the aftermath of war or a natural 
disaster. 
 
Initial evidence from FCAS, however, shows that contextual factors matter for the 
sustainability of outcomes. Evidence from an economic empowerment programme in Liberia, 
which gave an eight-week course in cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and a US$200 cash 
transfer to urban men at risk of engaging in crime, found short-term increases in self-
employment and earnings, and a reduction in criminal engagement one month after the 
programme ended (Blattman et al. 2015). However, the gains had dissipated a year later due 
to criminal loss as these men were working in insecure and fragile neighbourhoods with high 
crime rates. The study found that once the effects on employment and earnings dissipated, 
criminal engagement began to rise again. 
 
The macro evidence suggests that weak institutions have more sustained adverse effects for 
FCAS than war, presumably because conflict eventually ends. Cerra and Saxena (2008) look 
at how national output was affected by two types of political crises: the outbreak of civil war 
and a sudden deterioration in constraints on executive power, in 190 countries. They find that 
output fell by around 6 per cent for both. They also find, however, that while national output 
rebounded from war, it persisted with the deterioration in executive constraints. This 
suggests that deterioration in political institutional conditions can have persistent long-term 
effects in FCAS. 
 
Finally, there is evidence which suggests that improvements in employment and earnings 
may not have spillover effects on violence reduction in FCAS. Berman et al. (2011) find no 
correlation between employment levels and insurgent attacks at the district level in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines. This evidence shows that the nature of mobilisations 
underlying insurgencies is likely to affect the correlation between employment, earnings and 
violence reduction. It suggests that the correlation is likely to be low when the political action 
underpinning insurgencies results in recruitment based on club goods or ideology as 
compared to political action that uses the low economic opportunity cost of conflict to recruit 
members. This indicates that the outcomes of economic empowerment programmes in 
FCAS will be sensitive to the political basis of mobilisations.  
 
The nascent literature on economic empowerment programmes clearly shows that political 
and institutional contextual factors matter. In spite of this evidence, programmes typically pay 
little heed to these factors in their design. 
 
6.3 Suggested directions for future work on empowerment in FCAS 
 
6.3.1 Paying heed to context 
The first big message from this literature review is that both programme design and future 
research on empowerment in FCAS must pay heed to context. A good starting point would 
be to build a corpus of research that enables us to understand which sub-national contexts 
promise the highest marginal return in terms of empowerment outcomes in FCAS. It would 
be important to analyse the pathways to impact in contexts with high and low returns. 
Research must also provide a better understanding of the factors that put these contexts on 
different paths. It would be important to understand the differences in the nature of 
distributive conflicts; the distribution of political, social and organisational power between the 
empowered and the disempowered and the de facto and de jure institutional environment in 
these contexts. This research is important because it will enable us to understand what types 
of interventions are best-fits for specific sub-national contexts. 
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6.3.2 Bringing politics and society centre stage 
The second big message is that action for empowerment will lack bite in contexts where 
accountability relations are weak and disempowered citizens are unable to influence the 
selection and accountability of social and political leaders. The evidence shows that 
economic empowerment interventions on their own rarely produce spillover effects in terms 
of social and political empowerment. This is also true of economic empowerment 
interventions that have high economic returns. We also know that the scale-up of successful 
economic empowerment interventions is highly sensitive to political and social contextual 
factors. This suggests that the design of interventions in the social and political spheres has 
to be an important part of empowerment programmes. The aim of these interventions should 
be to strengthen the accountability relationship between the empowered and the 
disempowered in FCAS. It would also be important to estimate the returns to programmes 
that combine interventions across spheres. We know that it may not be enough to focus on 
the design of formal institutions in contexts where ethnic and clientelist politics is embedded. 
An important future direction of research would be to design interventions that can enable the 
marginalised to hold local ethnic and clientelist apparatus accountable7 or reduce the 
reliance of the marginalised on ethnic and clientelist groups.8 Designing information 
interventions that seek to affect the accountability of ethnic and clientelist machines is a 
promising area of future work. 
 
6.3.3 Combining interventions is likely to promise higher returns 
I have already argued that combining social, political and economic interventions may be 
necessary to enhance the empowerment of the marginalised in FCAS. There is emerging 
evidence that combining economic and social interventions may promise high returns in 
FCAS (Blattman and Ralston 2015). In particular, the literature identifies experimentation 
with socialisation interventions as a promising area of future work. There is a large qualitative 
literature on how violence groups use strategies of coercion, indoctrination and socialisation 
to shape young people’s behaviour (Vigil 2003; Wood 2008; Maruna and Roy 2007). 
Blattman and Ralston (2015) make a strong case for experimentation with combined 
rehabilitation programmes that use similar socialisation techniques in reverse process. The 
problem in FCAS isn’t just access to capital (financial or human), it is also insecurity due to 
environmental shocks and a weak institutional environment. In this context, it would be 
important to empirically assess the returns to programmes that combine capital-centric 
interventions with insurance or community-based collective action around protection. 
 
6.3.4 Building trust between states and communities 
It is difficult to see how programmes can reduce violence without building citizen trust in the 
state, giving organised groups a stake in peace and an incentive to shift their allegiance 
away from non-state actors. Building trust will require moving away from centralised delivery 
models and giving communities a voice in the programming of state initiatives. There is some 
evidence to support the efficacy of this approach in FCAS. Berman et al. (2011) show that 
small-scale community identified reconstruction projects funded by the US military led to 
fewer insurgent attacks in Iraq and the Philippines. Olken (2010) shows that direct 
participation in political decision-making can substantially increase the satisfaction and 
legitimacy of development projects. 
 
  
 
                                                 
7  An example would be generating citizen or provision report cards on unelected local intermediaries employed by 
 ethnic and clientelist apparatus and revealing the results to the apparatus’ electoral leaders. This may help change 
 the accountability relations between citizens and the intermediaries and strengthen the incentives for these 
 intermediaries to become more responsive to marginalised groups. 
8  Land titling programmes are an example that has shown promising results in terms of reducing clientelist 
 dependence. 
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6.3.5 Developing clarity in defining programme goals and identifying target groups 
Empowerment programmes often have multiple goals that can be achieved through different 
target groups, yet these programmes and their theories of change often lack clarity about the 
groups that would be the most effective targets. For example, programmes designed to 
reduce violence may have poverty reduction as a complementary goal and fulfilling these 
multiple objectives may require targeting different groups. This is important as the poorest 
group in a population, which is often the target of these programmes, may not be the high-
risk one (Blattman and Ralston 2015; Blair et al. 2013). Therefore, theories of change for 
these programmes must define programming goals clearly and identify the most effective 
target group through which these goals can be achieved. 
 
6.3.6 Giving centrality to experimentation and diagnostics 
This review makes it clear that there are no silver bullets for addressing the empowerment 
challenge in LICs and FCAS. There is ample evidence that economic empowerment 
programmes that have received large allocations of public money have failed to show 
adequate returns in terms of economic empowerment and haven’t produced the anticipated 
spillovers for social and political empowerment. This suggests that there is a problem with 
implementing a best-practice and solution driven development approach in a context where 
the portfolio of effective solutions doesn’t exist. We have to recognise that we can only move 
forward through experimentation, testing and innovation. This would require an approach 
where small-scale innovative interventions are tried and tested to see what works based on a 
rigorous embedded diagnostic system. The aim would be to scale-up what works and shut 
down what doesn’t.  
 
6.3.7 Knowledge gaps 
There are a number of knowledge gaps about FCAS settings that need to be addressed if we 
are to design effective theories of action and change. As mentioned earlier, there is a paucity 
of rigorous empirical work on the mechanisms that enable disempowered citizens to hold 
social and political leaders accountable in non-democratic settings. It is particularly, 
important to analyse the role of spontaneous politics, public protests, revolutions and non-
electoral checks and balances in this regard. Further work is needed on the relationship 
between different types of inequality and empowerment in FCAS settings. The development 
and economic history literature seems to suggest that economic inequality may not be an 
adverse factor for empowerment in FCAS settings and much more attention may need to be 
paid to political inequality. The formation of voter preferences and the strategies used by 
political elites in this regard are really important areas of future research. As mentioned 
earlier, voter preferences may not behave in ways suggested by conventional theory and 
they may be endogenous to messaging used by politicians and the media. This suggests that 
the interaction between voter preferences and political strategies may be iterative and non-
linear and this would require designing very different mechanisms of change. 
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